

## **VANDERMEERSCH Patrick**

### **The failure of second naivete. Some landmarks in the history of French Psychology of Religion.**

Very little is still known of the heroic period of psychology of religion when French psychoanalysis and theology met. A single formula of P. Ricoeur has survived: second naivete. It is often quoted, and in the epilogue of his impressive overview of the psychology of Religion, David Wulff refers to it when he pro-poses post-critical belief as the important topic for further research. Few people however know the context in which this formula was written down in 1960 nor what it exactly meant at that time. Meanwhile, the whole problem linked with it faded away in Western Europe until the isolated words reappeared in America. Being an European, I will not discuss the question whether one could put actual American questions concerning religion under Ricoeur's 1960 belief statement. In this article, I will restrict myself to a rough sketch of the context wherein the sentence on second naivete appeared for the first time, giving thereby a glimpse of a very interesting but all too often ignored part of the history of psychology of religion.

#### The peculiarities of European Catholicism

It must be very hard for an American, even an American Catholic, to get a clear view on the different shapes European Catholicism has taken during the last cen-turies. First, you should sharply distinguish two types of countries. In the first ones, Catholicism coexisted with protestantism and had to care for distinctive characteristics in order to keep upright its own identity. In other countries Catholicism had nearly a monopoly in the religious sphere. There `Catholic', `Christian', `believer' and `religious' could be indiscretely used as synonyms. The reality indicated by those terms was however nor compact nor uniform. Although there was and is no denominational differentiation, you can find under one and the same heading quite distinct features. There were and are conservative Catholics, yes indeed. But there have been very pro-gressive, even revolutionary ones, and they have played an important part in the political history of nineteenth century Europe. The most famous example of revol-utionary Catholicism is of course that of the French abbés of the lower clergy, who were the regular buyers of the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert and triggered the French revolution when they decided to join the tiers état so that the power of

the king collapsed. In 1789 and 1830 in Belgium and in 1830 in Poland, there were revolutions under Catholic guidance. And there are still other, less known examples. If you can manage to pay a journey to Portugal, and you have the chance to seek for some shadow in a small square in Viseu, not far from the restaurant listed in the Rough Guide, please look upside to the statue dedicated 'to our bishop, our great revolutionary'. Read the quotes of his favourite sentences, like 'Religion is just like salt: a bit is perfect, but too much spoils the whole meal'. Being a Belgian, born in a small country between France and the Netherlands, I thought I knew how different Catholicism could be among neighbour countries, but in Viseu I realised that the differences within nineteenth century European Catholicism were bigger than I could imagine.

Dealing with European Catholicism, you should know all those differences brought about by a the vicissitudes of history. For if the twentieth century has established at the surface a certain conformity and synchronicity in the cycle of conservative and progressive phases in the Catholic church, differences in the nineteenth century's underpinning should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, there are some general trends. Seen from Rome, the problem appeared as follows. During the French Revolution and the Napoleonic time, the papal authority had lost the moderate amount of authority it possessed before. The nineteenth century was the time of recovery, but in a paradoxical way. The pope - or, better, as was said in earlier times: La cour de Rome, the Roman court - lost its political power. Meanwhile, bit by bit, he conquered moral authority, and brought this to a summit never reached before. In 1870 the pope had lost his papal estates, but he had become infallible.

In this context, the main concern for Rome was to re-establish obedience to authority in the Catholic's minds. Too many of them had been attracted to the ideals of freedom and democracy. Belgium was a particularly dangerous example not to be followed. The whole episcopate had supported the Belgian Revolution of 1830. When Rome had insisted that good Catholics should remain faithful to their king (in this case, the Dutch king), a polite but clear letter had been sent by the Arch-Bishop of Malines saying that the holy Father did not understand rightly the situation. If he would have done so, he would have blessed the Belgian Catholics. Those rebellious bishops thereby pursued intellectual goals and did not show much inclination to ask recognition by Rome when opening a Catholic University in Malines (translated to Louvain in 1835), where free-thinking spirits were appointed. All this went in the complete opposite direction Rome wanted. For the latter the choice was clear: no intellectual controversies on matters of faith, but firm devotions, deeply rooted in the soul of the ordinary men, endowing trustworthy minds with humility and admiration for simplicity and suffering. Rome was on the way of canonizing the curé d'Ars and the Petite Sainte Thérèse. It was not seeking for intellectualised Catholicism.

Rome's Catholic 'Restoration' reiterated actually the same tactic that had been used to fight protestantism two and a half centuries before. Instead of discussing matters of belief on a theoretical level, it had then appealed to the human sentiment, how paradoxical that might be. For in theory, Catholicism advocates a view on believing as being rooted in the intellectual sphere, while Luther had insisted upon the fact that believing means in the first place thrust, and thus belongs essentially to the heart. But in practice the Catholic reaction against protestantism favoured popular religion, wherein the Virgin Mary and a devotional fascination for holy suffering (the Holy Heart of Christ, but also of Mary, of Joseph,....) took a central place. In fact, the theme was not completely new. It could be traced back to the Rhenan mystique of the twelfth-thirteenth century, where the triumphant Christ of the Resurrection had been replaced by the suffering Christ. But during the counter-Reformation, it was becoming widespread. Sentimentalism rose and evicted progressively the great spiritual traditions of Jansenism and Quietism that were the last bastions high standard Catholic thought. Lots of religious congregations established in the seventeenth century refer to holy suffering in their spirituality. The 'Stabat Mater dolorosa' became a favourite representation - and a favourite theme for composing music. At the same time the celibate priest became progressively a reality. A mere coincidence? At a more profound psychological level probably not. In any case: the council of Trent had decided to establish seminaries wherein young males would be trained to fulfil the new outlined ideals of a parish priest: he should become not only a dispenser of sacraments, but also a trustworthy confessor giving spiritual guidance to the faithful who became more and more concerned with their guilt feelings.

The nineteenth century Restoration tried to use the same remedies for the religious crisis that had surfaced again during Enlightenment and Revolution. However, the situation was different. The separation between Church and State had become a given fact. Thus the ecclesiastic authorities had to find other means to give to the faithful the psychological feeling of belonging to a Mother-Church. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Montaigne still could say that he was Catholic just in the same way as he was perigourdin: he was born in Perigord in the same way as he was born in Catholicism. In the nineteenth century, even been born in France, 'the elder daughter of the Church', was not enough any more for experiencing oneself as being a Catholic. Thus devotional life was organised in this way that it gave to the individual the impression to belong to a group. The ordinary people became the central target of new missionary attempts. Humility was more stressed than ever, but at the same time it was counterbalanced by the feeling to belong to a powerful group. In many countries, Marxism and Socialism could be faced by a Church canalizing social claims in own organisation. In this way the Church was proud that it could favour a harmonious social evolution without clashes (no Marxist dialectics!). The model one wanted to refer to was that of the Christian Middle Ages. When the nineteenth century

Catholic Church was building, neo-Gothic architecture flourished. The French revolution had abolished Latin and exorcisms in the Catholic liturgy? They were re-established, and the Benedictine monks of Solesmes solemnly re-introduced Gregorian Chant.

In this appeal to piety and devotion, a huge part was devoted to the Virgin Mary. No century has been as 'Marial' as the nineteenth, and Mary seemed to be pleased with it. She started her apparitions with Catherine Labouré in July 1830, during the Revolution in Paris, and warned France that if the cross was treated with contempt, blood would flow. Then she appeared in La Salette in 1846. A programmatic dogma was proclaimed about her in 1854, this of the Immaculate Conception. The dogma, that has nothing to do with virginity, states that Mary was the only human being that was born without the original sin. Proclaimed shortly after K. Marx's communist manifest (1848) and A. Comte's Catéchisme positiviste (1852), the dogma aimed to give in a devotional way an answer to them. As Mary was the only one being born without sin, no other human being should believe that the human mind and the human will could give trustworthy advices for the ruling of society. Let us thus remain humble, very humble, as a child under the protection of a sovereign mother... When a woman appeared to Bernadette in Lourdes in 1858, she was identified after a while - not without some suggestions of the clergy - as being the 'Immaculate Conception'. Mary continued her apparitions: Pontmain (1871), Krüth-Neubois (1872), Pellevoisin, St-Palais and Marpingen (1876), Dittrichswald (1877), and she went on, so often that it was sometimes explicitly spoken of an epidemy.

In this very peculiar devotional context with its emphasis upon an influential mother-figure (poorly counter-balanced by a Saint Joseph in the Holy Family), sex became more and more the central issue in Catholic morals. An acceleration took place when the Anglican Lambeth conference accepted contraception as being licit in August 1930. Immediately, the Vatican reacted and the same year (actually on 31 December 1930) the papal encyclical Casti conubii condemned severely every form of birth control. From then on, a rampant war took place in order to move, little by little, the official Roman standpoint. Some more 'natural' ways of limiting offspring, such as taking the menstrual cycles into account with the use of the thermometer or the calendar, could they not be accepted as they were not so un-natural? After a first papal 'no', these practices gradually seemed to be less wrong and at a certain moment one could behave as if this had been always the accepted Catholic way to deal with contraception. But in the case that serious Catholics couples would nevertheless be compelled to renounce to sexual intercourse, should they not be allowed to practice la carezza, a penetration without ejaculation? More than a mild smile is needed to understand the obsession as well of the church authorities, as well of the faithful, to have the Catholic bedroom well regulated. But one should really be aware that this was the topic par excellence to test if one was a real Catholic or not. Seen from the outside, e.g. from a protestant tradition, one cannot but wonder that

not the existence of God or the sacred character of Revelation and the Bible were at stake in a context wherein the world outside the church became the most important one. But the existence of God was obviously not a problem for Catholics: many of them seemed firmly convinced that even if the pope was asking impossible things from them and, thus, they could not but sin, le Bon Dieu would understand them benevolently. And the Revelation? The Bible? Catholics were not used reading it, and as far as the nineteen fifties one should ask for special permit to read the Old Testament. So we meet here a very particular psychological type of believing, which still needs to be studied more in depth from a psychological point of view, as it seems not to proceed initially with the inner acceptance of creeds formulated in the form of propositions. It is a way of believing completely alien to that designers of questionnaires have in mind when they ask 'do you believe that x (God, heaven, hell, angels, Noah's ark, etc) really exists', even when they tend to moderate the crude 'believe in equals believe that' by a likert-format with five grades (I agree completely, rather, I do not know, I think rather not, I disagree completely).

So one can understand that psychoanalysis was received rather with sympathy by those Catholics who wanted to free themselves from the sex obsession and, starting from there, from a conception of morality reduced to obedient following of detailed prescriptions for daily life. Of course, one knew that Freud himself was an atheist and had written some essays expressing his views that religion should be overcome by science, but in this Freud just repeated only what they were used to hear from other scientists, and Freud's argumentation did not hit their religious problem. As to France, that will play the central part in the acceptance of psychoanalysis by Catholics, how much did the French public really know of Freud? Only a limited part of Freud's work had been translated into French in those days. Freud was mainly known through the work of R. Dalbiez, who made a sharp distinction between psychoanalysis as therapy and the theoretical part in Freud's oeuvre. In France there had been already before the second World War psychoanalysts being known as Catholics, as R. Laforgue who was interested in spirituality. Thus theologians did not feel uncomfortable using psychoanalysis as a liberating technique in a religious world where candles, sweet sado-masochistic representations of holy suffering, guilt and sex had overgrown real concern about the existence of God and his relation to mankind.

This emphasis upon devotional life and sexual morality does however not mean that there were no intellectual attempts at all to deal with the Christian heritage. During the last two centuries there actually have been several waves of theological reflection that tried to confront religious belief and modern world. One has however the impression that, the cases in which social problems were directly addressed excepted (think of liberation theology), less attention was paid to them by ordinary churchgoers than it was the case among Protestants. Thereby : theologians were mostly were swiftly silenced by vigilant church

authorities. One can easily enumerate the different waves that have succeeded each other since the French Revolution. The 1864 Syllabus errorum, the list of condemned errors, states under final number 80 as a really wrong opinion 'that the Roman pope can and must reconcile and accommodate himself with progress, liberalism and the modern state'. Lots of professors were compelled to resign from Catholic universities. A little bit more freedom came up at the end of the nineteenth century, and under the patronage of a rediscovered Aquinas, contact was re-established with modern science. It was even approved by pope Leo XIII in his encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879). When this acceptance of rational and scientific approach resulted in very critical questions addressed to the historical reliability of the biblical accounts, Rome started a heavy 'anti-modernistic' crusade and the encyclical Pascendi put in 1907 an end to it. Again, lots of professors at Catholic universities had to resign.

### Psychoanalysis rescuing Catholic guilt on sexual matters

After the second World War optimism surfaced again among Catholic intellectuals. France was taking a leading position, with the so-called Théologie Nouvelle. This approach advocated a philosophically coherent reflection upon human religious experience. At the origin, a reappraisal of the 'real' Thomas Aquinas was at stake, for one deplored that a century of scholasticism had covered up Aquinas's sharp views on the intrinsic relationship between theological reflection and human reason. Under his patronage acceptance of new scientific insights, evolutionism included, followed. As could be expected from the ongoing cycle, the Encyclical Humani generis (1950) condemned these approach. The same year, a new dogma concerning Mary was declared: that she had been taken to heaven body and soul directly after her death - a new emphasis upon the unicity of the Immaculate Conceived.

This authoritarian act did actually only stress the already present protest feelings. They will be acted out in the zone where they probably ever have their psychological seat: the area of sexual morality.

In August 1948, the London International Congress on Mental Health was held. This big conference was the confluence of three different groups that used to have there own congresses. One of those, the International Conference on Medical Psychotherapy, had chosen 'guilt' as central theme. The proceedings reveal very interesting discussions and famous names. After the solemn mass on 15 August in Westminster abbey, some Catholic participants privately met and talked a lot on the problems of mental hygiene in their own church. Most of them were British: L. King, s.j., professor of psychology at the Heythrop College in Oxford, Dr. Fitzgerald, Dr. Burns, Miss Barbara Low (an early disciple of Freud). There was also a Belgian jesuit, A. Snoeck, and an very active French woman, Maryse Choisy. They decided to organise congresses for

Catholic psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, but as the English were hesitating about where and when, Maryse Choisy took the initiative to send invitations around. She was involved in the *Revue Psychè*, existing then for three years and that had already organised congresses on related topics in the abbey of Royaumont in the Val-d'Oise. It was however in the Benedictine abbey of Bec-Hellouin in Normandy that the first conference for Catholic psychiatrists and psychologists was held from 16 to 23 April 1949. There, the participants decided to organise every year a congress on 'Psychiatry and clinical psychology' to deal with problems regarding Catholics in particular. So was done, in 1950 at the Jesuit's in Chatelard near Lyon, in 1951 in London, in 1952 in Amersfoort (the Netherlands). There it was decided to do things well for the next conference. So the fifth congress took place during the Eastern period in Rome, and the chosen theme was: 'The basic attitude of the Christian psychotherapist'.

Having a congress in Rome included of course a papal audience. The congress members were rather surprised on 13 April 1953 while hearing Pius XII saying in his address: 'Nobody will deny that there can be, and not seldom, an irrational feeling of guilt, even a sick one.' The pope added of course that a psychotherapist should be respectful for real feeling of guilt, but the congress participants felt happy. Few people knew that something quite different had happened one or two days before. Rome remained awfully Rome. One of the participants of the congress was Marc Oraison, a physician specialist in urology who had been ordained as a priest, and had just completed his doctoral thesis in theology on Catholic sexual morals. He received a message that he should go to some bureau of the Vatican. There two cardinals were waiting for him, one of both being the terrific cardinal Ottaviani. It was said to him that his thesis had been put on the Index, the list of the forbidden books.

A year later, the famous book of A. Hesnard, *Morale sans Péché* was published. This book of a psychoanalyst of the first generation who had published before a textbook on sexology of many editions and a tough *L'univers morbide de la faute*, was meant for a broad audience. It became indeed very successful. Hesnard criticized the Catholic moral theology as being in fact an anti-moral. Instead of helping people to make their own moral decisions deliberately, Catholic morals provoked anxiety. Catholics had become so afraid of their feelings of guilt, that they often preferred not to take any initiative and not to act rather than to risk the torments of their conscience. The emphasis lead by Catholicism on sexual matters was stigmatized as the main mistake in the way Catholicism had perverted the real meaning of moral conscience. Think of the neurotic anxiety of a mortal sin people could have after having masturbated! One definitely needed to get rid of this neurotic concern with guilt. Hesnard pleaded for a 'morals without sin', a moral conscience directed to what should be done instead of a complex mechanism serving the egoistic feeling of 'I have nothing to reproach to myself'.

A huge tumult followed and it seemed as if psychoanalysis would be condemned by Rome. After some discussion the organising committee for the congresses on 'Psychiatry and clinical psychology' decided to ask some internationally recognized Catholic psychiatrists for support in the attempt to safeguard a psychological reflection on Catholic morals. Support was given by J. Lopez Ibor, Gr. Zilboorg, H. Ey en Ch. Durand. The last one, a Catalan, would become the key figure and soon the president of a society that would become more than an organisation committee for yearly congresses. The 'Catholic Organisation for the study of the relations between normal psychology and psychopathology' ('L'Association Catholique Internationale pour l'Étude des Relations entre la Psychologie Normale et la Psychologie Pathologique') was born. Recognition of the psychological and, more especially, psychoanalytical approach was however not easy to conquer. The local synod of the diocese of Rome condemned in 1960 psychoanalysis: no priest of the diocese of Rome should refer some of his parishioners to a psychoanalyst. Many intellectuals were upset, and under the influence of the famous moral theologian B. Häring an important diplomatic campaign was organised in order not to have that text - that had already been published in the French newspaper *Le Monde* - officially listed in the columns of the *Osservatore Romano*. One feared that the Catholic church could condemn psychoanalysis worldwide, but it did not happen. When the second Vatican council was announced, new hope came up that, finally, all those upsetting problems on sexual morality would finally be settled. However, the two really hot topics, contraception and celibacy, were subtracted to the council's authority and reserved for a later papal decision. This has finally gone in the complete opposite direction as the one expected: the encyclical *Humanae vitae* reiterated in July 1968 the condemnation of contraception, and in November 1971 the Synod on priesthood decided to maintain celibacy mandatory.

So twenty years long, from 1948 until 1968, as far as the Catholic world was concerned, psychology was mainly invested in area of sexual morals, and psychoanalysis was eagerly accepted as an auxiliary. In France and Romanic countries in general, psychoanalysis became the cornerstone of pastoral psychology, while Rogers became it in the United States of America. Marc Oraison, who had decided not to keep silent after his Roman meeting with Ottaviani, reached an enormous audience with more than 30 books and lots of articles, many of them having been translated into English, German, Italian, Spanish and Dutch. Considered from a theoretical point of view, they surely lack accuracy and depth, but they gave at that time an adequate pastoral answer to people's anxieties. They have surely contributed to make a psychoanalytic spirit very popular among Catholics in Europe. It is said that even pope Paul VI read Oraison's book *Morality for our time*, and not without some positive evaluation.

More theoretical depth is to be found in a few theologians who did combine a psychoanalytic optic with a thorough knowledge of the history of theology and spirituality. The first one to be named is Father Bruno, Carmelite, who was interested in mystique from a psychological point of view and published on this topic already before the second World War in the *Études carmélitaines*. In 1948 this review devoted a very interesting and thick issue to Satan. Two other pioneers were the Jesuit L. Beirnaert (1906-1985) and the Dominican Albert Plé (? - 1988). The last one would publish a lot of interesting psychological articles in *La vie spirituelle*. When this had been forbidden by the religious authorities, he obeyed and he emptied the review from psychological articles, but he founded in 1947 the *Supplément à la vie spirituelle*, where this approach could be found a refuge.

Under the influence of their personal analysis, many priests decided to live a sexual life, either by entering into marriage or by getting involved in a sexual relationship. Historical research on the history of celibacy and priesthood made it clear that the reasons for the introduction of this practice were very ambiguous: ritual taboos on pollution before the Eucharist and the fear that parishes with their belongings would be transmitted from father to son as it was the case with the offices of notaries and the chemist's shops. Thereby, psychoanalysis made people conscious that they should distinguish their own wishes from other people's wishes, and it became clear that the celibacy of the priest had nothing to do with a personal vow, but that it was just a law imposed by others (the *lex continentiae*), and that one could question about the legitimate character of this law. As to the religious life in religious congregations, where there was a vow of chastity, the same Church history showed a still more puzzling ambiguous motivation at its origin, as ascetic monachism and sexual renunciation pretended to replace the ideal of the martyr. A heavy critique of the spirituality of priesthood surfaced. The experiment of G. Lemercier, a Belgian who became prior of a Benedictine monastery near Guernavaca (Mexico) and decided in the beginning of the sixties to introduce psychoanalytically inspired group therapy for the community, was met with suspicion by the Roman authorities, but with much interest by many participants at the Vatican Council. When it became clear that the Roman authorities would stick to the old-time sexual standard (as it became clear in the 1971 decision on the celibacy of priests and in the 1975 statement accepting homosexuality as a given fact, but not as a human possibility that could be actualized), many of them left ministry. Some of them became psychoanalysts, as this practice appeared to them quite in consonance with the way they would have liked to exercise priesthood. As Lacan differed from the IPA by making no problems of non-medical candidates for psychoanalytical training and favoured a conjunction between psychoanalysis and the humanities, they mainly became members of his School.

## The importance of Lacan

Authority, sex and guilt: the emphasis Catholicism had led on those topics in the last centuries explain why psychoanalysis had been so eagerly adopted by Catholics. In France, theology became involved in the Lacanian debate. An important shift resulted from this. Lacan's introduction of the concept of 'symbolic order' will lead to a reflection upon religious language. His concern for linking psychoanalysis with philosophy was on the same track as Catholic theology that had always advocated a philosophical basis and insisted upon the fundamental value of 'natural theology'. Lacan's insistence in his later work on the way the awareness of something metaphysical or absolute belong to the core of psychoanalytic practice, brought new interest in mystique. In the midst of several authors involved in this debate, three important names emerge: A. Vergote, P. Ricoeur and J. Pohier.

But let us start by giving some landmarks. Jacques Lacan was and still is a very controversial individual. Hated or at least considered as a fool by some, he is adulated as a magnificent master by others. But in the period we are dealing with, after the Second World War, he was simply one of the most brilliant and noticeable members of the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, and he was its president at the moment that this old and venerable French branch of the international psychoanalytic movement entered into conflict with the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) in 1953.

At stake was the issue of the training of analysts. A very strict program had been established and this was experienced by many candidates as being too much a school program. They protested also against the very severe control on the way the training analysis was performed. After a heavy polemic, the larger part of the members decided to leave the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, that was a part of the IPA, and they founded the Société française de Psychanalyse. Soon Lacan joined them. Actually, the refugees to the new society did not realise that by doing so, they lost membership of the IPA. When this became clear, they asked for recognition of their new society by the IPA. A committee composed of Ph. Greenacre, R. Eissler, W. Hoffer and the Dutch J. Lampl de Groot - it was said that she was the most stubborn on the matter of analytical orthodoxy - and with D. Winnicott as president was sent to Paris in October 1953 in order to investigate the situation there. They concluded a year later that the new society did not meet the requirements for recognition by the IPA. After years and years of diplomacy, the question of recognition was put again on the agenda, and the condition imposed by the IPA was the exclusion first of A. Berge, F. Dolto and J. Lacan, later of J. Lacan alone, at least in so far as they had been recognized as didactic analysts. As a consequence, Lacan created own

school in 1964, the *École freudienne de Paris*. He himself dissolved it in 1980.

But back to the crucial year 1953, the year of the above mentioned Fifth International Catholic Congresses of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology, that took place in Rome at Eastern. The crisis about the training of analysts in the French branch of the IPA, the *Société Psychanalytique de Paris*, was culminating. On the 16 June 1953, Lacan resigned as president of this society and joined the newly founded *Société française de Psychanalyse*. To manifest its existence on the international forum, the new society held on 26 and 27 September a congress in Rome. There Lacan delivered his programmatic lecture *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse*

In this essential text, Lacan emphasises the fact that the ego is always a split ego, that has the tendency to forget this intrinsic split by constructing in a narcissistic way an image of the own self in conformity with other people's expectations. The so-called orthodox technique of frustration-aggression-regression, adopted by the IPA in order to reinforce the 'ego', actually means a further occultation of the inner split and a further alienation of the human subject. This direct critique of H. Hartmann and his ego-psychology is based upon Lacan's conception that the 'I' proceeds in fact from the impact of language upon the upgrowing psyche. The identity one narcissistically lingers at, is the effect of what one has heard from others, but many parts of what has been said has undergone censorship. Lacan introduces his well known formula: 'the unconscious is the discourse of the other'. Thus, instead of focusing to stages in instinctual maturation that should be worked through in order to reinforce the ability of the ego to cope with frustration - the technique advocated by the IPA - the analysis should stick at what the analysand says and carefully detect the blanks appearing in his or her discourses. Only in this way psychoanalysis can produce a true word, *une parole pleine*.

After this statements aimed to defend his own praxis against that one advocated by the IPA, Lacan questions further why the very concrete words picked up by a child are so important in the erection of the image of the own self. He introduces the themes that will shape his theory: the importance of the name of the father and of the symbolic order. When we try to summarise those themes as he will develop them in the first years of his teaching, we come to following picture. The separation of the mother is the essential pivot. Developing further Kleinian notions, he insists on the fact that the father plays an essential part in the process of separation from the mother. In fact, his role is double, and the duality of his functions is often too easily overlooked by those who see him only as a 'frustrator'. Of course, there is a negative side to the father, as he confronts the child with the fact that its mother is not only interested in its majesty. There is, however, also a positive side to this. The father imposes an identity on the child by giving him or her a name and introducing the child in what Lacan calls 'the symbolic order'. In so far as

the father is understood as a father-figure, a representative of further authority, and in so far as he represents more than the particularity of his individual being, his symbolic presence introduces the child into a cultural world in which human desires seek fulfilment in a symbolic way. These two sides, the negative and the positive, are to be found in Lacan's play on words: 'Le «nom» du père est en même temps le «non» du père', the name of the father is at the same time the 'no' of the father.

One sees what could be interesting for theologians in this theory: the emphasis upon language as an autonomous reality to which the psyche should submit itself in order to escape from psychosis. A psychological reflection upon the religious meaning of the authority of the Word and of belief in revelation could proceed from here. Actually, as we will see further on, this will be the way Lacanian thought will move away theological reflection away from a narrow concern with sexual morals and bring it to a reflection on the formulations of the religious creeds about God.

But back to Lacan and his position in those years. What could appear as being only a curious anecdote, should be mentioned here. Lacan was absolutely wanting to have during the Rome congress a private audience with the pope, whom he called the 'common father'. He was absolutely wanting to convince him that psychoanalysis was of an extreme importance for Christianity. In order to obtain this audience, he appealed to the influence not only of his brother who was a Benedictine, but also of the French embassy, however without any success. The famous lecture on the *Fonction et champ de la parole* opens with a reference to the Vatican hill, in the form of an etymology which links 'Vatican' with the Latin verb *vagire*, the first crying of the baby and, thus, the origin of speech. To complete this petite histoire we should tell that Lacan, not having succeeded to get his private audience, wanted to go to a public one, what he actually did in company of S. Leclaire and the already mentioned Maryse Choisy.

A few weeks later, on 18 November 1953, Lacan started his public seminars, that would draw for years a large audience to him. In the context of the ongoing discussion with the IPA, at the very time that the commission presided by Winnicott was investigating the orthodoxy of psychoanalytic practice and training in Paris, Lacan took as topic for the first year (1953-54) Freud's writings on analytical technique. The next topics would be on the ego in Freud's theory and practice (1954-55), on 'Freudian structures in the psychoses' (1955-56), and then on 'the object-relations and Freudian structures' (1957-57). The emphasis on the term 'Freudian structures', that has been mostly skipped in the titles of the published texts, should not be overlooked.

Here A. Vergote comes in. Being an priest of the diocese of Bruges (Belgium), he had been send to the Louvain University in order to study philosophy and theology. He completed both brilliantly, obtaining a doctorate in both disciplines: in theology in 1951 on the theme of

testimony in the gospel of John and in 1954 in philosophy on the concept of the will in Aquinas. Nothing predisposed Vergote particularly to become a psychologist of religion. He had followed a very common track Belgian dioceses and Bruges in particular used to follow: sending the best pupils for a part of their study to the university, often but not always philosophy and theology. There were many priest candidates in those days, and priests were not confined in pastoral activities: there were many other positions in Catholic institutions wherein priest could take a central position: teaching in secondary schools, management of Catholic social organizations, Catholic universities. Thus bishops could very well employ academic trained priests, to whom they gave not automatically an appointment in the direct continuation of what they had studied. Academic training was then considered as being a basic training directed to the person of the student, and not, in the line of a very sad actual trend, to a job needed by the market.

So, after his study, Vergote was waiting for the future the bishop's mind would design for him. Borrowing a bicycle from the Louvain professor in psychology J. Nuttin, himself also a priest of the diocese of Bruges, had an unexpected effect. Nuttin, who was one of the first Catholic professors in psychology to devote a book to Freud and psychoanalysis, was looking for a young academic able to go deeper into the domain of psychology of religion. Nuttin asked if Vergote was interested in psychology of religion and, if this was the case, he would ask the bishop and organise things so that he could immediately start with some lectures on the topic: that was the best way to get into a new topic. Vergote accepted, but insisted upon the fact that he wanted to have the opportunity for further study. An agreement was reached and, as Paris is finally not so far from Louvain and there are good trains, Vergote went in 1955 for a psychoanalytic training to Paris. There he would attend Lacan's seminars from 1955 until 1958 and have a didactic analysis with him.

Very soon, he wrote some important articles on psychoanalysis and phenomenology and on the theory of symbolism. Vergote recalls that Ricoeur said to him that it was the reading of one of these articles that he became aware of the real value of psychoanalysis. He realised that psychoanalysis referred to more than the area of guilt that he was then unravelling, as we will see. Meanwhile, Lacan continued his seminars: in 1957-58 on the unconscious, in 1958-59 on desire and interpretation and in 1959-60 the famous one on the ethics of psychoanalysis. Lots of things were breeding in the French intellectual climate in this period. Psychoanalysis took more and more a central position in the humanities, and very soon structuralism joined it. A central pivot in the ongoing evolution was the Colloque de Bonneval on the unconscious in 1960. Lacan, Ricoeur and Vergote were there in the midst of many celebrities. But before going to this central turning point, let us introduce Ricoeur, who came from a quite different horizon before entering the psychoanalytic world.

## Paul Ricoeur and the problem of the free will

Paul Ricoeur was born in 1913 in a protestant family in Valence, in Provence. As his mother died very soon after his birth, and his father in the first World War, he was brought up with his grand parents in Rennes. In the last year of his secondary school, the already mentioned Roland Dalbiez, author of the book on Freud, was his teacher of philosophy. Ricoeur was deeply impressed by his teachings that went against the current idealistic views who believed that consciousness was able to grasp itself. Ricoeur continued to study philosophy at the university in Rennes and then became acquainted with Gabriel Marcel. He started his career as a teacher of philosophy in secondary schools. Then the second World War came. Ricoeur joined the French army and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He spent those five years by studying German philosophy and making a translation of the first volume of the *Ideen* of E. Husserl. The war being over, he applied Husserl's phenomenology in his doctoral dissertation on the human will, *Philosophie de la volonté* (1950). The topic reflected the fact that Ricoeur is a protestant. The doctoral dissertation was imbedded in a broader project. He wanted to perform a philosophical enquiry of the *servum arbitrium*, the enslaved will, the cornerstone of protestant doctrine. Making use of Husserl's method of the 'eidetic reduction' he tried to catch the real core of the human will in the midst of the multiplicity of empirical phenomena.

Already in his doctoral dissertation Ricoeur refers - rather briefly - to psychoanalysis. According to him, the core of psychoanalysis lies in the process of gaining consciousness. He insists upon the fact that the unconscious does not bring the conscious in discredit, on the contrary. Due to the interpretation given by the psychoanalyst, the unconscious character of a representation is taken away. Ricoeur is still considering psychoanalysis as a technique that broadens the field of consciousness.

According to the original plan, *Philosophie de la volonté* had to be followed by two other books. First the limits of the will would be considered: not only those resulting from the dark knots between body and mind, but also those stemming from intrinsic conflicts within the will itself. Secondly a 'poetic' of the will would be written, a description or evocation of the way the will can be liberated from its own slavery. Actually, the last book has never appeared. As to the previous one: Ricoeur has been wrestling with it for a long time, and finally it fell apart in two: one dealing with the primal symbols of the bad, and another dealing with the myths on the beginning and on the end. Thus at the end there were actually three books, but the one that had been announced as the third one was missing - something that passed unnoticed in many translations.

What had happened? During his writing Ricoeur hit a problem he felt unable to solve easily. It appeared that the experiences of limitation of

the inner freedom are usually expressed in mythological language, and that it is very tricky to have this language translated in clear concepts. Ricoeur experienced the need of a reliable hermeneutic of these myths, and this hermeneutic was understood by him as an interpretation of the central symbols used by those myths. That was the way he became interested in psychoanalysis, as psychoanalysis appeared to him as being the discipline par excellence to uncover the hidden meaning of symbols. Another fact activating his interest in psychoanalysis was the request to make a review of the yet mentioned two books of A. Hesnard, *L'univers morbide de la faute* (1949) and *Morale sans péché* (1954).

Although not being a Catholic, Ricoeur thus became involved in the Catholic discussion on guilt. One can actually notice that in his book on the self will, biblical stories on the feeling of guilt take a rather important place. Ricoeur is conscious of the fact that his text reflects a tension between the rational, philosophical style of his doctoral dissertation and his attempt to evoke by symbols the real experience of guilt. Is it possible to lay a bridge between rational reflection and the world opened by the symbol? Ricoeur does believe it. The famous and often quoted text of Ricoeur on the 'seconde naïvete' is to be found at the end of the second volume of *Finitude et culpabilité: (II: La symbolique du mal)*, from 1960. There he expresses this confidence with the famous formula 'Le symbole donne à penser, 'The symbol gives rise to thought'. According to his own words, he was found of the formula. Thinking thus begins with what, at the origin, is only delivered through symbols. Ricoeur refers hereby to Schelling, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, but also to more recent writers such as Leenhardt, van der Leeuw, Éliade, Jung and Bultmann. He says that he has been deeply inspired by the last one's article on 'The problem of hermeneutics' in *Glauben und Verstehen*. He is convinced that hermeneutics, although being a modern acquisition, can bring man back to the sacred. This recovery of the sacred Ricoeur calls 'second naïvete.'

The formula became immediately popular and was eagerly adopted by theological and pastoral circles, together with a sentence of André Malraux 'Le prochain siècle sera mystique ou ne sera pas'. The all too easy way churches looked for relief in those sentences at the moment their institutions were shaken by the process of secularisation, irritated one of my teachers so much that he used to apply Mt 12, 43-45 to the theme of the second naïvete: 'When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept and garnished. Then goes he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man is worse than the first. Even so shall it be also... with the second naïvete.'

What is now this second naïvete, so much celebrated by some, but also, and not without reasons, met with some suspicion by others?

When you limit your reading of Ricoeur to selected passages of the 10 pages conclusion of the second volume of *Finitude et culpabilité*, you can draw following picture. There was a time were human beings were still connected with the sacred, with a fullness of meaning which delivered itself to the human ear in the richness of the symbolic language. The necessity of mastering nature and to get a technical grip on the reality resulted in the fact that an unequivocal meaning was imposed to the words, and that language lost its polysemy and its power to evoke the sacred wherein human existence is imbedded. Following passage taken from Ricoeur's text can be put to the fore:

Le moment historique de la philosophie du symbole, c'est celui de l'oubli et de la restauration. Oubli des hiérophanies, oubli des signes du sacré, perte de l'homme lui-même en tant qu'il appartient au sacré. Cet oubli, nous le savons, est la contrepartie de la tâche grandiose de nourrir les hommes, de satisfaire les besoins en maîtrisant la nature par une technique planétaire. C'est à l'époque où notre langage se fait plus précis, plus univoque, plus technique en un mot, plus apte à ces formalisations intégrales qui s'appellent précisément logique symbolique, c'est à cette même époque du discours que nous voulons recharger notre langage, que nous voulons repartir du plein du langage. (p. 324-325)

There are clearly Heideggerian reminiscences in this text, and I can imagine that people who stress nowadays the transitional sphere in the psychoanalytical approach to religion, could be very happy with this portion of Ricoeur's text. But it is only a portion, and even when we limit our attention to that portion we should be aware that introducing the theme of the second naivete, Ricoeur warns us immediately that there is no way back to the first naivete. The resto-ration of the full meaning of language and of the power of the symbol can only be achieved by taking an active position of ongoing interpretation:

Mais ce que le symbole donne, c'est à penser. A partir de la donation, la position. L'aphorisme suggère à la fois que tout est déjà dit en énigme et pourtant qu'il faut toujours recommencer et recommencer dans la dimension du penser. C'est cette articulation de la pensée donnée à elle-même au royaume des symboles et de la pensée posante et pensante qui constitue le point critique de toute notre entreprise. (p. 325)

Thus what Ricoeur advocates is not that after a phase of critical reflection, we adopt a mood of happy relativizing, buying CD's with organ music or gregorian chant, going now and then back to church not only for the children, but for the aesthetic value of the solemn Catholic mass... How interesting this way of relating to religion might be from a

psychological point of view, this is not the second naivete Ricoeur has in mind. There is nothing of Proust in his theory. There is no happy way back to childhood, there is only the ongoing task to interpret the past. The second naivete is the compelling need for adopting time and again an active position by a continuous hermeneutic of the past:

Est-ce à dire que nous pourrions revenir à la première naïveté? non point. De toute manière quelque chose est perdu: l'immédiateté de la croyance. Mais si nous ne pouvons plus vivre, selon la croyance ordinaire, les grandes symboliques du sacré, nous pouvons, nous modernes, dans et par la critique, tendre vers une seconde naïveté. Bref, c'est en interprétant que nous pouvons à nouveau entendre; ainsi est-ce dans l'herméneutique que se noue la donation de sens par le symbole et l'initiative intelligible du déchiffrement. (p. 326)

I do not believe that this is the second naivete many church-leaders really want. But back to Ricoeur. How do we have to conceive this ongoing process of interpretation that is the core of the second naivete? Ricoeur announced his answer for the third volume of *Finitude et culpabilité* that did actually not appear. The reason is that Ricoeur became aware of the structuralist critique of the comparative method he had been using in the style of the phenomenology of religion according to Van der Leeuw and Eliade. The work of Claude Lévy-Strauss became very influential in the sixties with *La pensée sauvage* (1962) and *Le cru et le cuit* (1964). Structuralism invaded linguistics, and that led to very specific studies on the metaphoric character of language in general. So the alternative symbolic-real could not stand any more as a simple alternative and asked for a more detailed analysis of what language performed. This insight was corroborated by what Ricoeur learned, despite an enormous amount of irritation, from Lacan. They would meet in 1960, in Bonneval. Meanwhile, Ricoeur started to study Freud more in depth. From 1958 on, Ricoeur devoted a part of his lectures at the Sorbonne to Freud.

## Ricoeur and Lacan

Lacan had always been interested in philosophy. It is said that when he was fourteen, he discovered Spinoza and decorated his room with a big self-made scheme of the *Ethica* of this philosopher. Then, in the last year of his secondary school, he was deeply influenced by his teacher of philosophy, Jean Baruzzi, who was working at that time at his doctoral thesis on Saint John of the Cross. Lacan, who had grown up in a pretty devoted Catholic milieu, became aware of the intellectual side of

Catholicism and realised that religion was not only an motive for devotion, but also an instrument for understanding culture. When he read Nietzsche (in German!) at the age of twenty-four, he definitively gave up the belief of his youth, and he found it very sad that he could not prevent his younger brother to become a Benedictine monk. Yet he kept up his interest in religion as part of Western culture.

Philosophy however was more important. Although studying medicine, he was acquainted with the Marxist lecture of Hegel made by Koyré and Koyève. He became a friend of M. Merleau-Ponty and this friendship lasted until the latter's death. He had also personal ties with Cl. Lévi-Strauss and, not to forget, with G. Bataille, as he married the latter's wife after their divorce - a fact that did not obscure the relationship between the two men. But all those philosophers finally remained at the distance of Lacan's work. At crucial moments in his life, Lacan tried to get in contact with other philosophers, obviously needing their authority as backing for his own theories.

Jean Hyppolite was the first philosopher with whom Lacan cooperated for a while. Hyppolite followed Lacan's first Séminaire of 1954-55 on the ego in Freud's theory and in the psychoanalytical technique, and took part in the discussion on the concept of 'Negation' (Verneinung) in Freud.

Next came Martin Heidegger. Lacan paid a visit to him in Freiburg at Easter 1955 and invited him in his country-house for the next Summer on the occasion of the colloquium in Cerisy-la-Salle where Heidegger had to deliver the lecture 'Was ist das, Philosophie?' By this occasion, Lacan asked Heidegger the permission to translate into French his text 'Logos', a commentary on Heraclitus. Heidegger accepted, and thus Lacan became the translator of the first text of Heidegger being published in French. Despite of this, Lacan did not succeed in arousing Heidegger's interest in his own thought.

The relation with Ricoeur would last longer and, even if it ended at both sides in bitterness, it has surely been important, for both of them. Ricoeur realised that the comparative method and the theory of symbols used by him in his *Finitude et culpabilité* was desperately obsolete.

But how did they meet? The same year 1960 wherein the two volumes of *Finitude et culpabilité* were published, the famous colloquium on the Unconscious was held in Bonneval. It was organised by the psychiatrist H. Ey, who managed to bring together tenants of the two opposed French psychoanalytical Schools, offering them a neutral terrain where they could meet. Next to Ricoeur, a whole series of psychoanalysts and philosophers were among the speakers. Lacan did not speak but was listed as discutant, just as J. Hyppolite, M. Merleau-Ponty and E. Minkowski. At the end of the colloquium, he offered to Ricoeur to join him in his car on the way back to Paris, and he proposed him to participate in his Séminaire. Ricoeur accepted, and actually constrained himself to be

there for a few years, more and more irritated and having the impression to understand nothing. At the same time, Ricoeur's son Jean-Paul became fascinated by Lacanism, read Freud on his own and started an analysis with a Lacanian analyst. Ricoeur became more and more puzzled. He talked a lot with the tenants of the opposite branch of French psychoanalysis, went in 1961 to Yale and then in 1962 to Louvain to lecture on Freud. There he talked a lot with A. Vergote and A. de Waelhens, who were in favour of Lacan. Stoically he continued to show up while Lacan was delivering some of his most important Séminaires: on transference (1960-1961), on identification (1961-1962), on anxiety (1962-1963). He was probably also present at a part of the Séminaire on the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (1963-1964). Meanwhile, Ricoeur continued working at his book on Freud, *De l'interprétation*.

Lacan was completely astounded when the book was edited in May 1965. Immediately, he realised that the book would be successful, as no such extensive and well documented book on Freud had appeared since that of Dalbiez. In fact, Ricoeur did exactly what Lacan was advocating: going back from the neo-Freudians to Freud. But nearly nothing of Lacan's thought appeared in the book. Worse: Ricoeur stated explicitly that he would not deal with the post-Freudians, Lacan included. He restricted himself to a philosophical reading of Freud, and referred thereby to Herbert Marcuse, Philip Rieff and J.C. Flugel.

Ricoeur's *De l'interprétation* is essentially an attempt to read Freud from a Hegelian perspective. Hereby Ricoeur rather extensively deals with the views of A. Vergote and A. de Waelhens on the possible relations and distinctions between phenomenology and psychoanalysis - views those two authors were actually leaving at that very moment, as I personally remember being their student in those years. Ricoeur said that one should radically accept the reductive and to the past directed element in Freud's analytical optic, but that this should be complemented with a teleological view, directed to the future. At the end of his book Ricoeur however confessed that he did not believe that Hegelian dialectics could overcome Freudian psychoanalysis as much that religious truths could become objects of rational proof. He said he continued to stand at the side of Karl Barth, who linked faith not with the intellect but with the will, the latter having to undergo the appeal of what you cannot but call a *kerugma*. Ricoeur concludes by stating that he hoped that a phenomenological approach of religion in the style of van der Leeuw en *Éliade* could be connected with a kerygmatic exegesis in the spirit of Barth and Bultmann.

Ricoeur's book was enthusiastically received by some, but sharply criticized in harsh reviews made by Lacanian psychoanalysts. M. Foucault, who was in those days very interested in Lacanian thought, mediated and obtained that Ricoeur could write a reply. As a consequence of his disappointment with Ricoeur's book, Lacan decided to write his own book. Up until then, Lacan's writing were not so numerous and they were

disseminated in very disparate publications. Mobilizing nearly everybody he knew and receiving an unlimited support from his editor, François Wahl, Lacan was able to have his own *Écrits* published in November 1966, a year after Ricoeur's book and a few months after another famous book, M. Foucault's *Les mots et les choses*. Lacan became immediately the psychoanalytical representative of structuralist thought.

As to Ricoeur, he was so exasperated by the way he had been treated by the Lacanians that for a long time he did not publish on psychoanalysis any more. When finally and exceptionally he did it, it was in Belgium in the book dedicated to the memory of A. De Waelhens. Although Ricoeur has repeatedly said that he has never understood Lacan, he had nevertheless become aware of the fact that the formula 'Le symbole donne à penser' deeply needed to be corrected. He realised a symbol could not be interpreted as if it were an autonomous entity. It could only be understood within the context of a given myth, a given culture. The theme of the 'symbolic order', introduced by Lacan in order to understand the differences between neurosis and psychosis, became a widely accepted topic. Influenced by this general structural reflection upon symbol and metaphor, Ricoeur's attention was drawn to the active part taken by the subject in the use of metaphors (*La métaphore vive*, 1975) and to the act of reading as a personal act of appropriation of meaning within the interpersonal and inter-generational relationships who produce meaning (*Temps et récit*, 1983).

#### A psychology of religion inspired by Lacan

If the contact with Lacan resulted for Ricoeur that he dropped his enquiry on psychoanalysis and religion, for others it meant a new impulse to rethink the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion on a fundamental level. A whole series of theologians became inspired by Lacan. As to Lacan himself, he continued to make references to the religious history of mankind and of Christianity in particular in the subsequent phases of the development of his theory. This is particularly true for the part of Lacan's work wherein he lays the emphasis upon the most fundamental but also treacherous type of attachment to the object, to 'la chose', and the part wherein he deals with the peculiarity of female desire.

In the space left in this already too lengthy article, we can only briefly mention some of the authors whose thinking stems from the crucial years we are dealing with - a survey of the French psychology of religion until now needing surely a whole book. The central theme taken by nearly everyone dealing with psychoanalysis and religion in those days was Lacan's view on the essential function of the name of the father, the subsequent distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic and the fact that a symbol does receive its meaning from the symbolic order

whereto it pertains. In a very curious way, these ideas of Lacan were sometimes used to corroborate some moralistic views. His conception that the symbol belongs essentially to a symbolic order became an argument that it should be a moral duty to keep upright culturally established differences, e.g. the firm distinction between male and female, with some strange consequences as e.g. that homosexuality seemed to be forbidden in the name of psychoanalysis. I remember our student criticisms on these moralistic concordisms that did not make the distinction between the necessary function of the symbolic order in so far as it shapes the ego-ideal and the tyranny of the super-ego. We summarised them as follows: 'Thus, the best way to respect the otherness of the other would be for a white heterosexual male to have sex with a black lesbian!' Of course there were less stupid attempts to underpin a moral concern with Lacanian categories. A typical book for this type of use of Lacan that I personally did not like but was rather well received, was that of D. Vasse, *Le temps du désir* (1969).

More important was the emphasis laid by Lacan on language, which made theologians reflect on the status of religious language, and especially on the name of God. J. Pohier is the first one to be named in this regard. After his philosophical and theological studies, this French Dominican had been sent from 1956 until 1959 to Montréal (Canada) to study there psychology, as this seemed to be a good basis to teach moral theology afterwards. Back in Paris he was indeed appointed as a professor of moral theology at the Dominican theological faculty 'Le Saulchoir' near Paris. There he soon becomes involved in the psychoanalytical world, and he became especially acquainted with Conrad Stein, an open minded analyst who had remained in the IPA-affiliated Société psychanalytique de Paris but who was also convinced that Lacanian thought was important and one should deal with it. In the midst of the controversy his book had raised, Ricoeur asked the journal *Esprit* if they could not find a theologian with some psychoanalytical experience to give a fair review of his book. Pohier was asked for and he wrote an extensive text wherein he discussed with respect, sympathy and criticism Ricoeur's work. But Lacanian sympathy was not alien to Pohier, and the title given to the review put it to the fore: *Au nom du père*, in the name of the father, - a title Pohier would use in 1972 for a subsequent book wherein he will add to his review some other articles.

We should not forget that Lacan's *Ecrits* did not have appeared yet at the moment that Pohier wrote his review on Ricoeur. Nevertheless, it is clear that the core of Lacan's thought is already well known in those days, also by Pohier who did not belong to the Lacanian incrowd. This appears in the two central points of criticism raised by Pohier. First, he refuses Ricoeur's distinction between religion and faith (*foi*), whereby psychoanalysis would challenge religion but let the own character of faith untouched. Secondly, he criticizes Ricoeur's conception that the aim of psychoanalysis would be to 'demolition' the oedipus-complex, (La

démolition de l'oedipe, détruire le complexe de l'oedipe) so that one would become able to renounce the father.

Concerning the distinction between religion and faith, Pohier is aware that he faces here the distinction between the Catholic and the Protestant tradition. He goes deeper into that distinction at the end of his article. According to him the experience of contingency that marks human life cannot but express a certain affinity of the essence of God with the essence of man. Thus Catholic trust in natural theology remains for Pohier the cornerstone for speaking about God. But Pohier's appeals also to Lacan in order to corroborate his position that one cannot say that Freud's critique is relevant for religion but leaves faith untouched. In this alternative, put to the fore by Ricoeur, 'religion' is to be understood as the human attempt to make from God an object that can be apprehended by the human mind - something radically rejected by K. Barth - while faith would be the human response to the invitation addressed by the unknowable Other. The latter term in the alternative is however still more subject to psychoanalytic critique, according to Pohier, for we have learned from Lacan that believing to be oneself the object of love of someone else is the biggest illusion we can foster. In other words, more than religion, faith is an illusion that psychoanalysis unmasks.

The second critique has to do with the 'demolition' of the Oedipus-complex that would be achieved by psychoanalysis. Ricoeur had been impressed by Freud's indication of how much the representation of the father is used in religion. As he thought that psychoanalysis unchained the analysands from their father, he was convinced that the same should be performed on the religious level. There too, the references to a father should be demolished. The result would be a more pure faith in a God who was completely 'Other'. Pohier criticizes Ricoeur as someone who has understood nothing of psychoanalysis' therapeutic aims. Thinking that one can free oneself from a father and that one could become really 'one-self' in doing so is the most extreme narcissistic phantasm and illusion one can foster! The real aim of psychoanalysis is to relativise the way the father-image has been loaded by the imaginary, so that one can resign the idealised representation of the perfect father, but not that one would put oneself on the throne in a narcissistic vacuum.

According to Pohier, Ricoeur missed the essential point in psychoanalysis for the reason that he did not deal with castration, an essential theme in Freud's thought. Explicitly referring to Lacan, Pohier insists upon the fact that castration has nothing to do with the possession of the deprivation of the phallus, but with the experience that one is not that sublime part of the body. Thus the issue of castration is not the distinction between male and female. A different problem is at stake from that of 'gender'. The experience of castration means fundamentally that one is not the sublime object to which the mother's desire is attached, and in realising that nobody is the idealised penis of the phallus, the person of

the father is relativized as being only one father among others, a representative of the principle of fatherhood.

We stayed so long with the article of Pohier as he distinguishes very well two different alternatives, that will be often amalgamated later on. At the one hand, there is the alternative between Catholic trust in natural theology and Barthian view on faith as initiated by God, the radically Other. At the other hand there is Lacan's distinction between the order of the imaginary and the order of the symbolic. Those are two different problems. It is surely an amalgam to say that the order of faith is identical with the order of the symbolic, and the order of religion is identical with the order of the imaginary!

A. Vergote is surely the author who has most extensively worked through the Lacanian thought and its relevance as well for psychoanalysis in general as for psychology of religion in particular. The reference to psychoanalysis in general is to be understood at a very practical level. When he came back to Belgium, he founded together with some other psychoanalysts who had been trained in Paris, Swiss and the Netherlands in societies that did not belong to the IPA on 8 July 1969 the Belgian School for Psychoanalysis, a society deeply influenced by Lacan but up until now reluctant to be totally absorbed by too sectarian Lacanian groups. Having been several times the president and member of the board of the School, he was confronted with the vicissitudes of transference in such institutions, and kept very close to psychoanalytic practice. A few years before he had written with two other founders of this School, a book that would be translated in many languages: *La psychanalyse, science de l'homme* (Psychoanalysis: the science of man).

As for the psychology of religion: the same year a textbook was issued that would have the same broad diffusion was published by him. In that period, Louvain was an important University centre where many Americans from the United States came to study philosophy and theology. There were also many students from other countries, South America in particular. Vergote was an appealing professor and conducted more than fifty doctoral dissertations. So his influence is not to be overlooked, especially in the Romanic world.

A survey of his work shows at the beginning the same concerns as that of the other theologians influenced by Lacan. The theory of symbolism and the importance of the metaphor of the father are investigated in so far as they necessarily shape the religious language. Vergote did however not restrict himself to a strictly psychoanalytical approach. He tried to match psychoanalytical insights with experimental data. Developmental research on the representation of God and its content was a main topic. He became well known for his transcultural study on the representation of God, as he showed that, despite of the name, the God represented as Father included in fact many maternal qualities. Finally, and not at least, he applied clinical psychoanalytical insights upon religious pathology.

To understand the importance of the last approach, something more should be said on Lacan's clinical views in the area of differential psychopathology. Lacan advocated a structural view on psychopathology. One should avoid enumerating isolated and observable symptoms, but investigate how they could relate to each other in a particular structure. Lacan distinguished three different structures: the neurotic, the psychotic and the perverse one. The belonging to one or the other structures did not mean automatically psychopathology. Everybody was shaped along one of those structures. The difference between normalcy and pathology had to do with the quantitative aspect of the slithers along one of those axes.

One of the main books of Vergote, *Debt and Desire*, is the analysis of one of those psychopathological structures, the neurotic one. In that book he carefully describes on a psychodynamic level the two basic forms of neurosis: obsession and hysteria. After having shown that the pathological forms of those two possible human structures consist of exaggerations of traits that belong to normal psychology, he analyses the way these two forms of the neurotic structure can organize religious material. The book is a very good example of the Lacanian and structuralist perspective. At the one hand, religion is understood as a pre-existing system, with creeds, rituals, an ecclesiastical organisation. At the other hand, there is the human being that will approach this system and will get involved in it according to the peculiar structure of his or her own psychology. Sometimes, the way the own psychological structure handles the religious system is pathological, but sometimes it remains inside the boundaries of normalcy, even when it surprises us. For many readers, Vergote's description of the 'normal' hysterical religious involvement of Theresa of Avila will remain a surprising, but challenging insight.

The most recent book of Vergote on sublimation is a fundamental reflection on psychoanalytic practice. Giving full weight to Freud's intuition that sublimation is an essential process in psychoanalytic therapy - and in life in general - but acknowledging that Freud failed in finding a consistent theory on sublimation, Vergote proposes not to drop the concept, but to investigate which theoretical presuppositions obstructed Freud in his theorisation on sublimation. One should prefer to cancel those presuppositions than the intuition concerning sublimation. The book surely asks for a new and further elaboration on the relation between psychoanalysis and religion - and I would add: and theology as a specific activity of the human mind.

Leaving second naivete for post-critical belief?

Let us look back. At the moment that Catholicism was trying to undo the knots of sexual morality, a sentence of a protestant philosopher was picked up and eagerly accepted as if it would rescue a Church:

second naivete. The formula was linked with a specific view on hermeneutics of a symbol that gives rise to thought. Meanwhile it has become clear that the term symbol cannot be used any more in a simplistic way to sustain an alternative real/symbolic. We cannot rely on a simplistic model of symbolic experience whereby symbolisation means the capacity of replacing in your imagination one object by the other. Anglo-Saxon psychology of religion, favouring Winnicott and his theory on the transi-tional sphere leaves the central problem of symbolism unresolved. We need a more complex model, whereby other aspects of the process of symbolisation, e.g. the typology of the in-ter-subjective relations fostering the acceptance and the trans-mission of metaphoric messages, are taken into account. Ricoeur recognized this very well, and it would not be fair to appeal to his authority to reintroduce such a simplistic opposition.

At the other hand, one should also be aware that the discussion on symbols and metaphors had the unfortunate effect that a real problem, that was unhappily associated with a too simplistic theory of symbolism, was skipped: the fact that the belief of religious people can go through a phase of criticism which transforms the type of their believing, without annihilating it. Unless you consider them as hypocrites and sentences them on the basis of your own ideology, you should accept with benevolent neutrality people saying: 'Clear, I do not believe any more in the historical reality of Noah's Ark or of the Resurrection of Christ's body, nor do I accept the authority of the Pope concerning sexual matters, but I do still consider myself as being a Christian!' So there seems to be, perhaps not a second naivete, but a post-critical belief. And it is surely important to understand how it functions on an intra-psychic level.

But let us not hurry to much while proceeding in this way, driven by the eagerness to produce a new scale, to send out questionnaires and to enjoy marvellous correlations. There is something important that we came across along our journey in those turbulent years of French psychology of religion and that we should not lose: the distinction between Catholics and Protestants on the nature of religion and/or faith. Should we not ask if in both cases the same psychology is involved and, thus, if the same type of post-critical belief will emerge? And to grasp this question in depth, let us consciously leave the presuppositions that we often stick at, despite of what we should know from the most elementary history of theology, namely that believing would be something on the cognitive level, i.e. the acceptance of the truth of a proposition without real proof for it, and that the distinction between belief systems would only consist in the varied content in this believing, but not in the psychology of the act itself. All too often, research is biased by this preconception.

Are there really different psychological structures of believing, and is believing really based on somewhat different than a cognitive drive to have a 'world-view'? The hypothesis should surely be considered seriously. Something should have stuck us at once when we read the title

of Ricoeur's book, *Finitude et culpabilité*, and when we know some basics of the history of Christianity: the central place taken by the experience of guilt. The real question people are confronted with could perhaps not be 'Can I still be a believer once I know that so many biblical stories are not true?', but 'Can I still be a believer once I do not bear any more the Christian spirituality based on the experience of guilt?'

Let us remember that Ricoeur's *Finitude et culpabilité* with its conclusion on the second naivete was the final product of a research project the author had decided to carry out since the publication of this doctoral thesis in 1949, on the *Philosophie de la volonté*. He wanted to give a philosophical elucidation of what was for him, a French protestant, essential to belief: the *servum arbitrium*, the enslaved will. Seen from these point of view, the famous quoted sentence on the second naivete does not deal with religion or religious symbolism in general, but with symbols of guilt and thus with the specific forms of believing that presuppose a specific psychological experience of guilt and grief. To be more precise, and to follow the pathway Ricoeur traced in the Preface of the first volume of *Finitude et culpabilité*, Ricoeur was struck by the fact that the problem of evil could not be understood as being just a variety of the category of limitation. There was something opaque in evil as it was a part of the human reality. This dark side could not be caught making use of the so-called phenomenological reduction in order to achieve a 'Wesenschau', a clear insight in the essential. A certain type of empiric philosophical method should be adopted in order to get a certain grip on it. Looking in this way to the given fact of the evil, Ricoeur made the constatation that in a first phase, you came across several myths giving expression to the mystery of the evil in various ways. There are myths telling us on an initial struggle between the powers of order and the powers of chaos, on the exile of the soul in a body, myths describing the human as being blinded by a hostile power, myths telling us the story of an original sin. But behind these mythical stories, in a second moment, something more essential appeared: the opaque character of guilt expressed itself always in a discourse of confession, and this discourse of confession was not addressed in direct speech, but made use of symbols. That was the reason Ricoeur studied the symbols of evil.

Unfortunately, this essential topic was not worked out furthermore in Ricoeur's work. What a pity, as the differences in guilt experience was the parting of the ways between Reformation and Contra-Reformation. Let us stay a while with what had struck Ricoeur so much when he was dealing with the opaque character of the evil, that could only be expressed in what he called 'a discourse of confession', a way of speaking coined by the structure of confession, instead of hurrying to the problem of symbolism, wherein this discourse of confession expresses itself. Ricoeur hits a point that has had a tremendous importance in the

religious history of the Western world: in what way do we need feelings of guilt in order to be able to believe?

History teaches us that the real core of the discussion between protestantism and Catholicism was not primarily on the question of the content of what you should or should not believe. It had not to do with the content of the propositions a Christian believer should accept as being true, but with the very nature of the act of believing: was it an act of the intellect, eventually constrained by the will, or was it an act of the emotional sphere, whereby the expression in sentences that your intellect could accept or reject was only of a very second-order nature? Protestantism, insisted upon the fact that in the Bible the words used for 'to believe' (in Greek: *pisteuo*) did not at all refer to an intellectual assent, but to faith, to an inner experience of trusting someone. So Catholics were reproached to promote a way of believing that was a mere *fides historica*, a belief that was emptied of its essential core of trust, while it was reduced to a 'belief that'. At the same time, Luther in particular, blamed the Catholic way of linking belief with anxiety and favoured a very confident *fiducia* in God's grace. In its reaction, the Council of Trent stated explicitly that anxiety and fear for punishment were actually necessary stages of faith.

From these discussions on, quite different types of pastoral care were established, in order to promote the specific choice about what was the essence of *pisteuo* (the English distinction between belief and faith is still a reflection of that polemic and introduces a clear cut in terms that could be interpreted in different ways before). A careful analysis on a psycho-historical level further reveals several types of inner distortions and conflicts on the respective pathways chosen by the tenants of both opinions. If in theory, *pisteuo* (belief/faith) considered along the lines of the structure of knowledge was favoured by Roman Catholicism, and natural theology e.g. was put to the fore, in the practice baroque art and popular devotions were, reflecting a deeper psychological level, the more essential forms of Catholic *pisteuo*. Even today, people who convert themselves to Catholicism, are mostly not looking for more rationality and logical formulas, but they are in love with incense, liturgy and a *Salve Regina* with candle light. At the opposite, in Protestantism heavy struggles about the precise formulation of the content of the creed were - and are - not unusual. Whereas the Protestant founding fathers insisted not upon the propositions one should believe in, but upon the inner experience of trust, the *fiducia*, Anglo-Saxon philosophy of religion deals with religious creeds as if they were a set of propositions functioning in the human mind the same way as the content of knowledge, only the fact that they do not stem from testable experience, being excepted.

An element that until now has not been studied in this context is the importance given by Catholicism to sexuality. Catholics have developed extensive treatises on sexual morals, with thousands of cases

discussing in detail how the sexual act should be performed. Protestantism did not. This differences last until today. When I, being a Catholic, read Ricoeur on the opaque character of evil, I immediately think of sex, and when I hear about a discourse of confession, I cannot but think of M. Foucault's central text in his first volume his history of sexuality, a book that in its original French edition bears the title 'the search for knowledge', where he shows how Catholic pastorals has laid the emphasis upon the obligation of analyzing someone's own sexual desires: 'This is the essential thing: that Western man has been drawn for three centuries to the task of telling everything concerning his sex; that since the classical age there has been a constant optimization and an increasing valorization of the discourse on sex; that this carefully analytical discourse was meant to yield multiple effects of displacement, intensification, reorientation, and modification of desire itself.'

A hypothesis comes to my mind: could it be that the importance given by Catholicism reveal that different psychological levels are involved in the Catholic and in the Protestant way of dealing with the opaque character of evil? Does this perhaps explain, more than pure intellectual market mechanisms, why Anglo-Saxon psychology of religion focuses upon the pregenital and the object-relations, while the genital and the Oedipal are more akin to Catholic sensibility? An attracting new field for research could be opened, and this psycho-historical research could make us aware of different psychological types in post-critical belief.

\* \* \*

This brief excursion into the realm of psycho-historical research should be sufficient to make us aware that we need to differentiate several types of believing if we really want to understand how belief can turn into post-critical belief. What we in any case should avoid, is to ask the question on post-critical belief with a questionnaire shaped by the un-conscious presupposition that 'post-critical' means 'once that the information, presented by the creeds, appears not to be true as factual information'. What we should surely avoid, is to mix up the way people relate in their creeds to what is told to them about the past (the stories of the Bible), the way they find it important (or not) to get unequivocal formulas of their creeds, the way they accept authority and ethical principles on religious grounds, and the way they relate to something like a transcendent reality in their actual life, as if all this elements were in the same way chained to each other all over the world.

A clear example was given to me in the small Spanish village were I make my field research on flagellation, a practice that has survived there since at least the beginning of the sixteenth century. When you ask members of the brotherhood of the Vera Cruz why they still perform that pretty curious ritual, they answer 'For we do it already for centuries'. To my Protestant students they like to add: 'You know, a human being is a curious animal. You need to believe in something'. The patron of the local

restaurant, who was born in the Canarian Isles, was also explicit: 'I do not go to mass, but when I have problems, I pray to the Virgin of Gran Canaria. Why not to the Virgin from here, for she is the same? I do not know. I pray to the Virgin of Gran Canaria'. So my friends performing still nowadays flag-ellation are really post-critical believers, perhaps from the sixteenth-century on, but they are, I assume, from a different type than some Protestant post-critical believers could be and, luckily, they are not adepts of a second naivete.

. De commentaar die hij leverde bij het Séminaire van Lacan vindt men in de *Écrits* van deze laatste, pp. 879-887.

. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 308-310; E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan. *Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée*, Paris, Fayard, 1993, pp. 299-306.

. The translated text was the first version of 'Logos', not the reworked text of 1954. See E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan. *Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée*, Paris, Fayard, 1993, pp. 300-306.

. E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan. *Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée*, Paris, Fayard, 1993, p. 299.

. H. Ey, Cl. Blanc, R. Diatkine, S. Follin, A. Green, G.C. Lairy, G. Lantéri-Laura, J. Laplanche, S. Lébovici, S. Leclaire, H. Lefebvre, F. Perrier, C. Stein and A. de Waelhens.

. For an account, see E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 317-328; The proceedings were published: H. Ey (Ed.), *L'inconscient (IVE Colloque de Bonneval)* (Bibliothèque Neuro-Psychiatrique de Langue Française) Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1966. One does however not find in these proceedings on pp. 159-170 the original text of Lacan's part in the discussion, as the text has been rewritten by him in 1964.

. *Le transfert*, Paris, Seuil, 1991.

. Les quatre concepts fondamentaux en psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, 1973; Engl. tr.: The four fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, London, Penguin Press, 1986.

. P. Ricoeur, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, p. 358-359. Engl. tr.: Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. This translation mentions: 'The Terry Lecture', while the book was obviously more than that. For the redaction see E. Roudinesco, Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 398-405.

. Ricoeur refers to Lacan only in a footnote, among those who have insisted upon the fact that language is the medium of psychoanalysis. He refers further to the book of W. Huber, H. Piron et A. Vergote, La psychanalyse science de l'homme, Brussels, Dessart, 1964. See: P. Ricoeur, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, p. 358-359.

. P. Ricoeur, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, p. 8.

. Ricoeur refers to A. Vergote, 'L'intérêt philosophique de la psychanalyse freudienne', Archives de philosophie 1958 (21) 26-59 and A. de Waelhens, 'Réflexions sur les rapports de la phénoménologie et de la psychanalyse' in id., Existence et signification, Leuven/Paris, Nauwelaerts, 1958. See: P. Ricoeur, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, p. 366-380.

. P. Ricoeur, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Paris, Seuil, 1965, p. 504-505.

. E. Roudinesco, Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 403-404.

. 'La question de la preuve dans les écrits psychanalytiques de Freud', in Qu'est-ce que l'homme? Philosophie/Psychanalyse. Hommage à Alphonse de Waelhens (1911-1981), Brussels, Facultés Universitaires St Louis, 1982. Engl. tr.: 'The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytical Writings', Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 25 (1977) nr. 4.

. The book has just (1997) been reprinted as a pocket book in the famous French collection Points.

. J. Pohier, 'Au nom du père', *Esprit* 1966 (34) nr. 347, pp. 480-500 and nr. 348 (April 1967) pp. 947-970.

. J.M. Pohier, *Au nom du père. Recherches théologiques et psychanalytiques*, Paris, Cerf, 1972.

. Ordinary French does not have two different words to distinguish faith from belief. In both cases *Foi* is used. Only specialistic academic literature makes use of *croiance* to point to belief, but in ordinary French the word does not refer to religious belief.

. Lacan has severely criticised the way 'der Untergang des Ödipus-Komplexes' had been translated in the Standard Edition as the 'demolition' of the Oedipus-complex. For Lacan, the Oedipus-complex was not a phase that disappeared once left behind, but it gave rise to a structure shaping the human psyche for the whole lifetime.

. 'Avouons ne pas être très satisfait de la solution esquissée par certains, soucieux d'assumer aussi bien la psychanalyse que la foi, et qui se fait encore sur le dos de la religion: celle-ci serait animée par le désir de l'homme pour Dieu, et comme telle soumise à toutes les vicissitudes dénoncées par Freud; la foi, elle, serait le témoin du désir de Dieu pour l'homme, et comme telle serait d'un autre ordre. Pour qu'une telle distinction, assurément fort utile et fondée comme nous le verrons, soit ici efficace, il faudrait pouvoir affirmer que la foi n'a rien à voir avec le désir de l'homme pour Dieu, ce qui nous semble théologiquement très contestable; mais il faudrait également que le désir de Dieu pour l'homme soit un terrain psychanalytiquement plus sûr que le désir de l'homme pour Dieu. Or non seulement il n'en est rien, mais nous savons au contraire, en partie grâce aux efforts de Jacques Lacan, que se croire l'objet du désir de l'autre est par excellence le terrain du leurre. L'illusion de cette foi qu'on veut préserver risque d'être plus radicale encore que celle de cette religion qu'on s'accorderait à dénoncer.' J. Pohier, *Au nom du père*, p. 21-22.

. See the lengthy footnote on p. 44-45.

. 'En désignant ce renoncement comme un renoncement au père, on fait bien droit à la façon dont le père peut effectivement être constitué comme objet mythique de la toute-puissance du désir. Mais on risque d'entretenir

un très grave équivoque, comme si le renoncement devait aboutir à «la constitution d'un ordre de choses privé de tout coefficient paternel, d'un ordre anonyme, impersonnel» (p. 320). Car tel n'est pas l'ordre du symbolique, en tant qu'on le distingue de l'ordre de l'imaginaire: et l'ordre du symbolique ne saurait en aucune façon être caractérisé par le renoncement au père. Tout au contraire, c'est en lui que le père prend pour le fils sa véritable valeur, c'est en lui que le fils peut se constituer authentiquement comme sujet qui est fils. Il y a là une différence radicale entre ce que Paul Ricoeur croit devoir retenir de la psychanalyse et ce que nous croyons devoir en retenir. L'importance de son enjeu serait clairement apparue s'il avait été le moindrement question du complexe de castration.' J. Pohier, *Au nom du père. Recherches théologiques et psychanalytiques*, Paris, Cerf, 1972, p. 44.

. W. Huber, H. Piron en A. Vergote, *La psychanalyse, science de l'homme*, Brussels, Dessart, 1964; Dutch translation: *Psychoanalyse, wetenschap van de mens*, Antwerp, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1966; Spanish tr.: *El conocimiento del hombre por el psicoanálisis*, Madrid, Guadarrama, 1967; Italian tr.: *La psicanalisi scienza dell'uomo*, Torino, Boringhieri, 1968; Port. tr.: *A psicanálise. Ciência do Homem*, Lissabon, Livros do Brasil, 1972.

. A. Vergote, *Psychologie religieuse*, Brussels, Dessart, 1966. Dutch tr.: *Godsdienstpsychologie*, Tiel, Lannoo, 1967. Italian tr.: *Psicologia religiosa*, Torino, Boringhieri, 1967. Eng. tr.: *The religious man. A psychological study of religious attitudes*, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1969 and Dayton (Ohio), Pflaum Press, 1969, Spanish tr.: *Psicología religiosa*, Madrid, Taurus, 1969. German tr.: *Religionspsychologie*, Olten, Walter, 1970. A completely reworked version of the book was issued in 1983: *Religion, foi, incroyance. Étude psychologique*, Liège, Mardaga, 1983; Dutch tr.: *Religie, geloof en ongeloof. Psychologische studie*, Antwerp, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1983; Ital. tr.: *Religione, fede, incredulità. Studio psicologico*, Milano, Ed. Paoline, 1985. Engl. tr.: *Religion, Belief and Unbelief: A Psychological Study*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1997.

. See J.-M. Jaspard, 'Pourquoi les hommes sont-ils religieux, si ce n'est par besoin? Histoire d'une déjà longue enquête menée par A. Vergote', in *Over de grens. De religieuze `behoefte' kritisch onderzocht*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1987, pp. 1-18.

. A. Vergote, *Interprétation du langage religieux*, Paris, Seuil, 1974.

. American textbooks often seem to have retain only that element from a much broader work, how important following study might be: A. Vergote

and A. Tamayo, *The Parental Figures and the Representation of God. A Psychological and Cross-Cultural Study*, Leuven, Leuven University Press and The Hague, Mouton, 1980.

. A. Vergote, *Dette et désir. Deux axes chrétiens et la dérive pathologique*, Paris, Seuil, 1978. Dutch tr.: *Bekentenis en begeerte? Psychoanalytische verkenning in de religie*, Antwerpen, De Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1979; Engl. tr.: *Debt and Desire. Two Axes of Human Existences, of religion and of Psychopathology*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987.

. A. Vergote, *La psychanalyse à l'épreuve de la sublimation*. Paris, Cerf, 1997.

. See for a typical example of such an approach that does not pay any attention to the distortion between the official statements on the essence of catholic vs. protestant belief and the actual way it functions in the believer's mind: Linda Zagzebski, 'Religious Knowledge and the Virtues of the Mind' in Linda Zagzebski (ed.), *Rational faith. Catholic Responses tot Reformed Epistemology*, Notre Dame (Notre Dame University Press), 1993.

. 'L'essentiel est bien là. Que l'homme occidental ait été depuis trois siècles attaché à cette tâche de tout dire sur son sexe; que depuis l'âge classique il y ait eu une majoration constante et une valorisation toujours plus grande du discours sur le sexe; et qu'on ait attendu de ce discours, soigneusement analytique, des effets multiples de déplacement, d'intensification, de réorientation, de modification sur le désir lui-même.' M. Foucault, *La volonté de savoir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, p. 33. Engl. tr.: *The History of Sexuality. An Introduction*, Middlesex, Penguin, 1978, p. 23.

. For a first account, see my article 'Du bon usage de la flagellation, et des problèmes posés par son interprétation', *Religiologiques* 1955, n. 12, 215-242. Dutch translation: 'Over het juiste gebruik van de geseling', in *Feit en fictie 2* (1995) pp. 15-32.

. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 236 - 377. The committee of the IPA

was also reluctant to accept pupils analyzed by A. Hesnard, as this analyst of the elder generation had not undergone a didactic analysis himself.

. In J. Lacan, *Écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 237-322. Engl. tr.: *The language of the Self. The function of language in Psychoanalysis*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1968; 2nd ed.: *Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1976.

. The text was too lengthy to be read in its totality, but it was available and an important discussion arose. See E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 257-280.

. In the English literature, the 'separation phase' is mostly credited to M. Mahler. Actually, in France Lacan introduced the theme already at the end of the fifties. Who would have doubts about this, can read the testimony of M. Foucault about this. See his article 'Le «non» du père' from 1962 (reprint in M. Foucault, *Dits et Écrits*, vol. 1, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, p. 199).

. Lacan was very well aware that his view could very well fit in the views of Winnicott, as becomes manifest in a letter written to him on 5 August 1960 and published in *October: Art, Theory, Criticism, Politics*, vol. 40 (1987), pp. 76-78: 'And yet how I do feel myself supported by and in agreement with your enquiries, in their content and in their style. Does not the "transitional object", all of whose merits I have shown to those close to me, indicate the site at which, precociously, that distinction of desire in relation to need is marked?' (p. 78).

. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 272-273; E. Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan. Esquisse d'une vie, histoire d'un système de pensée*, Paris, Fayard, 1993, pp. 274-275.

. *Les écrits techniques de Freud*, Paris, Seuil, 1975. Engl. tr.: *Freud's Papers on Technique*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

. *Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse (1954-1955)*, Paris, Seuil, 1978; Engl. tr.: *The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

. Les psychoses 1955-1956, Paris, Seuil, 1981; The Psychoses, London, Routledge and Kegan, 1993.

. La relation d'objet. Paris, Seuil, 1994.

. In Louvain, it is not usual to have the whole dissertation published. Only a part of it or an synthesizing article should be written. Vergote did it on the representation of the crucifixion in the gospel of John. He shows that the crucifixion is actually depicted by John as an exaltation: not the miserable end of the man Jesus, but already the manifestation of his deity: 'L'exaltation du Christ en croix selon le quatrième evangile', *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 28 (1952), pp. 5-23.

. Het wilsrealisme in de filosofie van Thomas van Aquino: studie van Thomas' wilsfilosofie in de thema's van het transcendentaal goede, de streving en de liefde (The reality of the will according Aquinas. A study of St. Thomas's philosophy of the will considered in the themes of the transcendental good, the appetite faculty and the love), *Doct. Fil, Louvain, Institute for Philosophy*, 228 pp., 1954

. This book has been very influential, with many editions and translations. We could trace: J. Nuttin, *Psychoanalyse en spiritualistische opvatting van de mens*, Antwerp, Standaard, 1949; Engl. tr.: *Psychoanalysis and personality. A dynamic theory of normal personality*, London, Sheed and Ward, 1954; German tr.: *Psychoanalyse und personalistische Auffassung vom Menschen*, Freiburg (Swiss), Universitätsverlag, 1956; Ital. tr.: *Psicanalisi e Personalità*, Alba (Cuneo), Ed. Paoline, 3th ed.: 1960; Portug. tr.: *Psicanalisi e Personalità*, Rio de Janeiro, Agir, 1955; Spanish tr.: *Psicoanálisis y concepción espiritualística del hombre*, Madrid, Bibliotheca Nueva, 1956. Although most of his subsequent publications have little to do with psychology of religion, he is also known for his adaptations of the M.M.P.I. for the selection of priest candidates: *Examen de la personnalité chez des candidats à la prêtrise: adaptation du test de la personnalité M.M.P.I.*, Louvain, Publications universitaires, 1956. Spanish translation: *Examen de la personalidad en los candidatos al sacerdocio: adaptación del test de personalidad MMPI*, Madrid, Razón, 1966.

. Nuttin took also part on 19-20 July 1956 in La Mendola (Italy) in the decisive meeting of the Permanent Organizing Committee for International Catholic Congresses of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology were the erection of an association was decided: Archives of the A.I.E.M.P.R.,

document in preparation of the Congress of 10-15 September 1957 in Madrid.

. A. Vergote, 'Psychanalyse et phénoménologie', in M. Raclot (Ed.), *Problèmes de psychanalyse*, (Recherches et débats nr 21), Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1957, pp. 125-144. Eng. tr.: 'Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology', in M. Raclot (Ed.), *Problems in Psychoanalysis*, Baltimore, Helicon Press, 1961, pp. 139-160. 'L'intérêt philosophique de la psychanalyse freudienne', *Archives de philosophie* 1958, 21, pp. 26-59. Engl. tr.: 'Philosophy's Interest in psychoanalysis', *Philosophy today*, 1958, 2, pp. 253-273. 'Le symbole', *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 1959, 57, 197-224. Engl. tr.: 'The symbol', *Philosophy today* 1960, 4, 53-72.

. Fr. Dosse, Paul Ricoeur. *Le sens d'une vie*, Paris, La découverte, 1997, p. 321-323.

. Les formations de l'inconscient

. Le désir et son interprétation.

. *L'éthique de la psychanalyse*, Paris, Seuil, 1986. Eng. tr.: *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, New York, Norton, 1992.

. The biographical material is to be found in P. Ricoeur, *Réflexion faite. Autobiographie intellectuelle*, Paris, Esprit, 1995; P. Ricoeur, *La critique et la conviction. Entretien avec François Azouvi et Marc de Launay*, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 1995; Fr. Dosse, Paul Ricoeur. *Le sens d'une vie*, Paris, La Découverte, 1997.

. E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Vol. I)*, Translation, introduction and commentary by P. Ricoeur, Paris, Gallimard, 1949.

. Often the date 1949 is given, that is the date wherein the book had been printed.

. 'Mais le facteur décisif de la cure est la réintégration du souvenir dans le champ de conscience. Là est le coeur de la psychanalyse. Loin donc que la psychanalyse soit une négation de la conscience, elle est au contraire un

moyen d'étendre le champ de conscience d'une volonté possible par dissolution des contractures affectives.' (italics by Ricoeur) P. Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté. Vol. I: Le volontaire et l'involontaire, Paris, Aubier, 1949, pp. 360-361.

. P. Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité. Deel 1: L'homme faillible, Paris, Aubier, 1960; deel 2: La symbolique du mal, Paris, Aubier, 1960. The first part of Finitude and Guilt has been translated as Fallible Man, Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1965; the second part as The Symbolism of Evil, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967.

. The same is to be said about the translations of Foucault's books on sexuality: volume 1, La volonté de savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1976 (Engl. tr.: The History of Sexuality, New York, Vintage Books, 1980) was intended as the introduction of a quite different series of books than those that are often presented as volumes 2 and 3, namely L'usage des plaisirs, Paris, Gallimard, 1984 (Engl. tr.: The Use of Pleasure, New York, Vintage Books, 1986) and Le souci de soi, Paris, Gallimard, 1984 (Engl. tr.: The Care of the Self, New York, Vintage Books, 1988).

. `... "Le symbole donne à penser." Cette sentence qui m'enchanté dit deux choses: le symbole donne; mais ce qu'il donne, c'est à penser, de quoi penser.

Le symbole donne: une philosophie instruite par les mythes survient à un certain moment de la réflexion, et, par-delà la réflexion philosophique, elle veut répondre à une certaine situation de la culture moderne.

Le recours à l'archaïque, au nocturne, à l'onirique, qui est aussi, comme le dit Bachelard dans La poétique de l'espace, un accès au point de naissance du langage, représente une tentative pour échapper aux difficultés du commencement radical en philosophie. Le commencement n'est pas ce qu'on trouve d'abord; il faut accéder au point de départ; il faut le conquérir. La compréhension des symboles peut appartenir au mouvement en direction du point de départ; car pour accéder au commencement, il faut d'abord que la pensée habite dans le plein du langage.'

` "The symbol gives rise to thought". That sentence, which enchants me, says two things: the symbol gives; but what it gives is occasion for thought, something to think about.

The symbol gives: a philosophy instructed by myths arises at a certain moment in reflection, and, beyond philosophical reflection, it wishes to answer to a certain situation of modern culture.

Recourse to the archaic, to the nocturnal, the oneiric, which is also, as Bachelard says in his *Poétique de l'espace*, a way of approaching the birthplace of language, represents an attempt to escape the difficulties of a radical beginning in philosophy. The beginning is not what one finds first; the point of departure must be reached, it must be won. Understanding of symbols can play a part in the movement towards the point of departure; for, if the beginning is to be reached, it is first necessary for thought to inhabit the fullness of language.' P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité*, vol. 1: *La symbolique du mal*, Paris, Aubier, 1960, p. 324, Eng. tr. p. 348.

. Ibid., pp. 326-327.

. 'Ainsi l'herméneutique, acquisition de la "modernité", est un des modes par lesquels cette "modernité" se surmonte en tant qu'oubli du sacré. Je crois que l'être peut encore me parler, non plus sans doute sous la forme précritique de la croyance immédiate, mais comme le second immédiat visé par l'herméneutique. Cette seconde naïveté veut être l'équivalent post-critique de la hiérophanie pré-critique.' Ibid., p. 327.

. 'The historical moment of the philosophy of symbols is that of forgetfulness and restoration. Forgetfulness of hierophanies, forgetfulness of the signs of the sacred, loss of man himself insofar as he belongs to the sacred. The forgetfulness, we know, is the counterpart of the great task of nourishing men, of satisfying their needs by mastering nature through a planetary technique. It is in the age when our language has become more precise, more univocal, more technical in a word, more suited to those integral formalizations which are called precisely symbolic logic, it is in this very age of discourse that we want to recharge our language, that we want to start again for the fullness of language.' Eng. tr. p. 349.

. 'But what the symbol gives rise to is thinking. After the gift, positing. The aphorism suggests at the same time that everything has already been said enigmatically and yet that it is always necessary to begin everything and to begin it again in the dimension of thinking. It is this articulation of thought given to itself in the realm of symbols and of thought positing and thinking that constitutes the critical point of our whole enterprise.' Eng. tr. p. 349.

. 'Does that mean that we could go back to primitive naïveté? Not at all. In every way, something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of belief. But if we can no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the original belief in them, we can, we modern men, aim

at a second naïveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by interpreting that we can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol's gift of meaning and the endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.' Eng. tr. p. 351.

. David M. Wulff, *Psychology of Religion. Classic and Contemporary*, (1st ed.: 1991) New York (John Wiley & sons), 1997.

. Actually, the term 'post-critical belief' refers to the current research of my friend and colleague D. Hutsebaut from Leuven, and it differs a lot from second naïveté.

. R. Aubert, *Le pontificat de Pie IX*, (1st ed.: 1952) Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1963; A. Simon, *Le cardinal Sterckx et son temps 1792-1867*, Wetteren, Scaldis, 2 vol., 1950; A. Simon, *L'Église catholique et les débuts de la Belgique indépendante*, Wetteren, Scaldis, 1949.

. De universiteit te Leuven, *Leuven, Universitaire pers*, 1986, pp. 175-179. Engl. tr.: *Leuven University 1425-1985*, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1990.

. For the historical context, see the classic overviews such as L.J. Rogier, R. Aubert and M.D. Knowles, *Nouvelle histoire de l'Église*, Paris, Le Seuil, 5 vol., 1963-75. See also a fascinating book on the liberal catholics in France during the nineteenth century: J. Cabanis, *Lacordaire et quelques autres*, Paris, Gallimard, 1982.

. A good introduction: J. Delumeau, *Le catholicisme entre Luther et Voltaire*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1ste ed.: 1971, 6th revised ed.: 1996. Earlier English translation: *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire. A new view on Counter-Reformation*, London, Burns and Oates, 1977.

. H. Marc-Bonnet, *Histoire des ordres religieux*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France (Que sais-je), 2. ed.: 1955. Cl. Lesegretain, *Les grands ordres religieux, hier et aujourd'hui*, Paris, Fayard, 1990.

. See the standard work of J. Delumeau, *Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en occident (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles)*, Paris, Fayard, 1983; Engl. tr.: *Sin and fear: the emergence of a Western guilt culture, 13th-18th centuries*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990. See also his less known book on confession: *L'aveu et le pardon. Les difficultés de la confession*, Paris, Fayard, 1990.

. R. Laurentin, *Lourdes: dossier et documents authentiques*, Paris, Lethielleux, 7 vol., 1957-1966.

. Ladan *Les apparitions en Belgique: une épidémie contemporaine* CTRL in PGG, niet in GBIB. Although the book is often quoted, and despite of the title, we found little in Jeanne Danemare, *Histoire du culte de la Vierge et de ses apparitions*, Paris, Fayard, 1958. A better (but not critical) overview is supplied by B. Chevallier and B. Gouley, *Je vous salue Marie. Guide pratique et historique de la dévotion mariale*, Paris, Fayard, 1981. For a general reflection, see E. Maeckelberghe, *Desperately seeking Mary. A feminist appropriation of a traditional religious symbol*, (1st ed.: 1991) Kampen, Kok Pharos, 1994.

. A classic: J.T. Noonan, *Contraception. A history of its treatment by the Catholic theologians and canonists*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966.

. A Dutch audience will surely wonder why the topic of 'religion as projection' was not more often raised. They should however realise that the heavy accent laid upon this topic is typically Dutch, and unfair to Freud (who dropped his attempts of explain the functioning of projection already in 1913). In the Netherlands, it was F. Sierksma (1917-1977) who made use of the term projection (which he actually used not in Freud's, but in Plessner's meaning!) to criticize very sharply religion in his book *De religieuze projectie*, Delft, Gaade, 1956, Engl. tr.: *Projection and Religion: an anthropological and psychological study of the phenomena of projection in the various religions*, s.l., s.n., 1990. Reacting to him, the Nijmegen catholic professor in psychology of religion H.M.M. Fortmann (1912-1970) spent years to write the three volumes of his *Als ziende de Onzienlijke. Een cultuurpsy-chologische studie over de religieuze waarneming en de zogenaamde religieuze projectie*. (As if we saw the Invisible. A psychological study on the religious perception and the so-called religious projection) Hilversum, Brand, 1964-1968. In this way to Dutch people the impression was given that Freud's essential contribution to religion was a projection-theory. In other countries the theme of projection did not attract people's attention in the same way. That was particularly not the case in France, where the debate with scientism, that

had started very early with A. Comte, had become boring (that's the usual way problems disappear, as politicians and church-leaders know: you do not always need to solve problems; just wait until they become boring), and Freud seemed not to be new in this regard.

. Only recently a complete and accurate translation of Freud's collected works has been undertaken, and this is not at all completed: S. Freud, *Oeuvres complètes*, sous la direction de A. Bourguignon, P. Cotet et J. Laplace, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.

. R. Dalbiez, *La méthode psychanalytique et la doctrine freudienne*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 2. vol, 1st ed.: 1936, 2nd ed.: 1949.

. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, p. 274.

. Official Catholic Church documents - at least those that officials want to recall - are to be found in H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, (1st ed.: 1854), continuously reedited: Freiburg, Herder. Recently, a German and a French translation of this classical manual have appeared: *Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen*, Freiburg, Herder, 1991; *Symboles et définitions de la foi catholique*, Paris, Cerf, 1996.

. A very good overview in J.M. Connolly, *The voices of France. A survey of contemporary theology in France*, New York, Macmillan, 1961. To get an impression of the way theologians experienced in those days the main concerns of their disciplines, see J. Daniélou, 'Les orientations présentes de la pensée religieuse', *Études* 1946, vol. CCXLIX, pp. 5-21; Y. Congar, 'Tendances actuelles de la pensée religieuse', *Cahiers du nouveau monde*, 1948, vol. IV, pp. 33-50; R. Aubert, *La théologie catholique au milieu du XXe siècle*, Tournai, Casterman, 1954.

. International Congress on Mental Health London 1948, vol. III: *Proceedings of the International Conference on Medical Psychotherapy*, 11th - 14th August, London, Lewis & Co., s.d. For the history of the I.A.I.E.M.P.R., I am very indebted to the work of Colette Degives, who takes care of the archives of that society, and who collected the most important documents in regard of its foundation in privately printed volume: *Pré-histoire, Fondation de l'A.I.E.M.P.R., et récit de ses fondements*.

. The first plenary session was on the genesis of guilt, with J. Delay as chairman, H.G. van der Waals, Rev. Thomas Gilby o.p. and A. Hesnard as main speakers and E. Jones as chairman for the discussion; opener of the discussion: I. Hendrick; among the speakers in the discussion: M. Choisy-Clouzet; The second plenary session was on 'Guilt and the dynamics of psychological disorder in the individual'. Chairman: H. Fulchignoni; main speakers: D. Brinkmann and John Rickman, President of the congress: J.R. Rees; Chairman for the discussion: H. Chrichton-Miller; Opener of Discussion: J.H. van der Hoop; among the speakers in the discussion: M. Klein; The third plenary session was on collective guilt. Chairman: M.K. el Kholy; Main speakers: M. Mead, E. Krijgers-Janzen, P. Bjerre; chairman for the discussion: W. Overholser; opener of discussion: H.V. Dicks; among the speakers in the discussion: M. Choisy-Clouzet.

. She published a lot on psychoanalysis and catholicism, but also on Yoga: L'anneau de Polycrate: essai sur la culpabilité collective et recherche d'une éthique psychanalytique, Paris, Psyche, 1948, 339 p. VDHOOP X 6249; Psychanalyse et catholicisme, Paris, l'Arche, 1950; Le chrétien devant la psychanalyse, Paris, Tequi, 1955; (with Masson-Oursel e.a.); Qu'est-ce que la psychanalyse? Paris, Arche, 1950. La métaphysique des Yogas: essais sur les techniques indiennes de la sublimation, Genève, Mont-Blanc, s.d. The information on the origine of the 'International Catholic Congresses of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology' is taken from the account given by M. Choisy herself in a (undated) letter to J-J Lopez Ibor (end 1955-beginning 1956) and in her closing adress at the Madrid congress in 1957. She refers to what she wrote nr 30-31 of Psychè, but I was unable to trace it. One finds some (rather sarcastic) biographical notes on her in E. Roudinesco, Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans, Paris, Seuil, 1986, pp. 206-207.

. Psychè. Revue Internationale de psychanalyse et des sciences de l'homme, 1946- .... NOG OP TE ZOEKEN IN UTRECHT

. Although the Congress resolutions speak of an 'Comité Organisateur Permanent des Congrès Internationaux Annuels de Psychiatres, Psychothérapeutes analytiques et Psycho-pédagogues Catholiques - Permanent Organizing Committee for International Congresses of Catholic Psychiatrists, Analytical Psychotherapists and Child-Guidance - Ständiger Organisationsausschuss der Internationalen Tagungen Katholischer Tiefenpsychologen, the letterhead found in the archives of the A.I.E.M.P.R. displays 'Comité Organisateur Permanent des Congrès Catholiques Internationaux de Psychothérapie et de Psychologie Clinique - Permanent Organizing Committee for International Catholic Congresses of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology - Ständiger Organisationsausschuss der

Internationalen Katholischen Kongresse für Psychotherapie und Klinische Psychologie'. Thus the explicit reference to psychoanalysis was dropped.

. Text in the *Osservatore Romano*, 16 April 1953, and in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 45 (1953), pp. 278-286.

. M. Oraison, *Vie chrétienne et problèmes de la sexualité*, Paris (Lethielleux), 1950. New edition with a foreword of L. Beirnaert: Paris (Fayard), 1970.

. M. Oraison, *Ce qu'un homme a cru voir. Mémoires posthumes*, Paris (Laffont) 1980, p. 92-93. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. II: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris (Seuil), 1986, pp. 209-215.

. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1954.

. He played a big part in the introduction of Freudian thought in France. To quote only a limited part of his publications: (with E. Régis), *La psychanalyse des névroses et des psychoses: ses applications médicales et extra-médicales*, Paris, Alcan, 1914; (with Toulouse e.a.) *L'inconscient*, Paris, Doin, 1923; *Les psychoses et les frontières de la folie*, Paris, Flammarion, 1924; (with Toulouse e.a.) *Traité de sexologie normale et pathologique*, Paris, Payot, 1933 (several editions); (with H. Wallon), *L'univers morbide de la faute*, Paris, PUF, 1949; *Psychanalyse du lien interhumain*, Paris, PUF, 1957; *De Freud à Lacan*, Paris, ESF, 1970, 2d ed. 1971, 3th ed. 1977.

. This association, that has dropped the signifier 'catholic' in 1972, has held congresses every three years, with a few exceptions, until today. 1957, Madrid: Religious life and mental health; 1960, Milan: Sin and culpability; 1963, Toulouse, Marriage and celibacy; 1966, Louvain, Pastoral relation; 1969, Padua: Types of psychological assistance in the education of priests and monks; 1972, Luxembourg: Faith questioned by human sciences; 1975, Cincinnati: Violence; 1978, Rome, the coming back of the irrational; 1981, Brussels, Our relation with the institution: neither with nor without; 1986, Barcelona: Science, faith, ethics; 1990, Antwerp: Representing the invisible; 1993, Geneva, Being someone different fanaticism, integrism, otherness, narcissism; 1996, Louvain-la-Neuve: Anxiety and hope. The theme for the 1999 congress in Rome will be: Certainties and the experience of a limit.

. Some of his books that have been translated into English: *Union in marital life. Its physical and spiritual foundations*, New York, Mac Millan, 1958; *Love or constraint? Some psychological aspects of religious education*, New York, Paulist Press, 1961; *Sin*, New York, Mac Millan, 1962; *Love, sin and suffering*, New York, Mac Millan, 1964; *Learning and love. Frank advice for young Catholics*, New York, Hawthorn, 1965; *The human mystery of sexuality*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1967; *The celibate condition and sex*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1967; *The harmony of the human couple*, Notre Dame, Fides, 1967; *Morality for our time*, New York, Doubleday, 1968; *Being together. Our relation with other people*, New York, Doubleday, 1970.

. For the life and work of M. Oraison, I am indebted to the research and interviews carried out by K. Degrauwe when he was a student of mine in 1983-84.

. In these days it was common that members of a religious congregations signed their articles just with their religious surname, so that it is not always easy to trace their original birth name. The same is true for their first name and time and again I have to warn students that if so many people have the initials 'R.P.', this has to do that they are referred as 'Révérend Père'.

. In 1926-1927 Janet published the two volumes of his *De l'angoisse à l'extase. Étude sur les croyances et les sentiments*, wherein he discussed the famous case of 'Madeleine' and draw conclusions for mysticism in general. In reaction, Bruno de Jésus-Marie published in his *Études carmélitaines* in 1931 an article 'A propos de la 'Madeleine' de Pierre Janet. I was not able to perform a further study of this periodical. I would like to mention that a good piece of information on the French psychology of religion stemming from the Charcot-tradition is to be found in St. Baeten's nearly completed doctoral dissertation on multiple personalities in past and present.

. He was the editor of two books on pastoral counseling: *Direction spirituelle et psychologie*, Bruges, Desclée de Brouwer, 1951 and the proceedings of the Louvain congress of the A.I.E.M.P.R. on pastoral relationship (see later): *La relation pastorale*, Paris, Cerf, 1968. The more essentials of his numerous articles have been published in *Espérance chrétienne et psychologie*, Paris, Éditions de l'Épi, 1964 and in *Aux frontières de l'acte analytique*, Paris, Seuil, 1987 and in *Aux frontières de l'acte analytique. La bible, Saint Ignace, Freud et Lacan*, Paris, Seuil, 1987. On p. 246 of this last book, issued two years after his death, some bibliographical dates are given. Very curiously, no reference is made to

him in the yearly necrology in the *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 1986, while a whole page has been devoted to M. de Certeau in the 1987 edition, p. 44. A few data are give by E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, p. 211.

. Two of his articles on sexuality have been republished in the journal *Le supplément* he had founded: 'La vertu de chasteté' (1st ed.: 1956) and 'Sexualité et culpabilité' (1ste ed.: 1965) (*Le Supplément* 1988, pp. 9-118). He gave a comprehensive of his view on morals in his book *Par devoir ou par plaisir?* Paris, Cerf, 1980. Some biographical notes are to be found in G. Rossi, 'Albert Plé: une vita dedicata al dialogo tra teologia e psicanalisi', *La civiltà catholica* 139 (1988) nr. 4, pp. 454-465.

. R. Gryson, *Les origines du célibat ecclésiastique*, Gembloux, Duculot, 1970.

. I have put the basic texts together in my book *Passie en beschouwing. De christelijke invloed op het westerse mensbeeld* (Passion and Contemplation. The Christian Influence on Western Conception of Man), Leuven, Peeters, 1988. Unfortunately, I was unable to made use of the rich insights of a classic book that appeared simultaneously: P. Brown, *The Body and Society. Men, Women and Sexual Renuciation in Early Christianity*, London, Faber & Faber, 1988.

. M. Bellet, *La peur ou la foi: une analyse du prêtre*, Bruges, Desclée de Brouwer, 1967. (Italian: *La paura o la fede: analisi del prete*, Roma, Ed. Paoline, 1968); See also a personal document given by a well known French psychoanalysts with an important bibliography: G. Bonnet, *Pourquoi je pars. Un prêtre en psychanalyse*, 2de ed., 1969. CONTROLEREN/ Fe y psicoanalysis, Madrid, Atenas, 1974, 132 P GBIB 159.9:2/BELL CONTROLEREN WAARVAN DE VERTALING

. E. Roudinesco, *Histoire de la psychanalyse en France. Vol. 2: La bataille de cent ans*, Paris, Seuil, 1986, p. 217. See also G. Lemerrier & F. Verny, *Dialogues avec le Christ*, Paris, Grasset, 1966.